Abstract. Packet lters have traditionally been used to shield IP networks from known attack ows, ususally within rewall systems connecting trusted and non-trusted network segments. As IP networks grow and tend to connect to more and more neighbor networks with unknown trust status, carrier-grade operators in particular are beginning to experience raising costs due to increasingly complex lter congurations that have to be applied to their networks, in order to maintain a desired security level. In this paper, we present a discussion on the general properties of distributed packet lter congurations and an algorithm for a simplied compilation of anticipatory static packet lter congurations in heterogenous IP networks.
Introduction
Over the past years, operators of private and public IP networks have seen an increased amount of security related incidents, ranging from the rare targeted break-in attempt to the more frequent worm and virus spread. One method to protect against these threats is to set up and maintain special trac-examination and -blocking functions at the edges of the network. The more sophisticated class of systems providing such functions are commonly called 'rewalls', which are often not only capable of simple packet-by-packet ltering but can also handle the inspection of the content of an entire connection.
The major benet in deploying rewalls is an organizational one: maintain one system that keeps out unwanted trac (and the malicious content it would import otherwise) instead of individually securing hundreds or even thousands of end-systems inside the network. However, this is only reasonable in an economic sense if the border between trusted parts of the network and non-trusted parts is known and if the number of links to from one part to the other is comparatively small. Large carrier-grade IP network operators in particular are confronted with the problem that they have many interconnection points to other networks and This work was partially funded by the Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung of the Federal Republic of Germany under contract 01AK045. The authors alone are responsible for the content of the paper. must also support a very high trac throughput at these points. This makes setting up and maintaining rewall systems at interconnection points a prohibitively costly task. Furthermore, borders are not as static any more as in the past, because when network operators grow and merge, the borders of their networks move. Nevertheless, IP carriers have an increased demand for lter functions especially to shield internal management communication driving their networks from being disrupted by denial-of-service (DoS) attacks [01, 02] . To meet this demand without having to deploy a set of expensive rewalls, operators usually fall back on the capabilities of commercial o-the-shelf routing and switching platforms to lter packets. This is often done in a very simple way by conguring lter rules on interfaces line by line within the routers or switches command line interface. A drawback of this method is that it is dicult to automate, especially in heterogenous, multi-vendor environments where lter congurations often have to be adapted to meet the routing platforms specic conguration syntax: as packet lter conguration has never been standardized in IETF management working groups, many operators still maintain packet lter rule sets semi-automatically or even manually.
As a consequence, the need for a exible mechanism that computes eective lter points (nodes and interfaces) and provides syntactically correct lter statements for the platforms within these network is growing. Our contribution in this paper is an investigation of a new method that automatically nds ecient lter placements for large, carrier-grade, IP networks with heterogenous components. We reconcile the lter-based protection against potential attack ows with anticipated network behaviour upon failure states, where independent routing plans provide resilience. Our method allows for arbitrary threat and use scenarios for a given network and incorporates the diverse, varying ltering capabilites of the nodes inside the network as well as the syntax needed to congure ltering behavior in nodes.
Related Work
In recent years, there has been a fair amount of research on packet lter conguration issues and rewall technology, however, these approaches most commonly focus either on platform/technology specic problems (developments from rewall vendors) or investigate issues that arise after lter rule sets have been applied. In particular, policy management has been researched, e.g. conicts that may result from distributed rule sets and how to resolve them [08, 05] . Although the distribution of packet lters in networks has been suggested earlier [06, 09] , it was, however, without incorporating the topologic eects that we investigate and describe in this paper. Automatic packet lter compilation for rewall systems has been researched [06, 07] , but also without considering topologic eects.
The current state in the area of automated packet lter conguration in multi-vendor environments is that there exists no Management Information Base (MIB) that allows setting lter rules via the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).
1 The Common Open Policy Service (COPS), which has been developed for policy-based networking and supports the conguration of classication statements, lacks a method for dening security related actions that are not IPsec-specic [10] . Middlebox Communications (MIDCOM), Simple Middlebox Conguration (SIMCO) and NAT/Firewall NSIS Signaling Layer Protocol (NSLP) are newer standardization eorts that aim for automatic conguration of rewall functions in so-called middleboxes (usually application layer gateways) but are quite heavyweight when it comes to implementation and scaling issues [11, 12, 13, 14] . It is thus still the best way to use the routing or switching platforms command line interface (CLI) when conguring packet lter setups.
Model Assumptions and Denitions
The development of packet lters has since the beginning seen many diering approaches and naming conventions. A classier/action pair is usually denoted as a lter rule, whereas a list of such rules is known to be a rule set. Some vendors also refer to those rule sets as access control lists.
2 When a packet does not match any of the individual rules in such an (ordered) list, a default rule, also known as lter policy applies. A policy that implicitly drops all non-matching trac is called whitelisting, whereas a policy that accepts all non-matching trac is known as blacklisting. Within the remainder of this paper, we will use simple (non-stateful) disallowing lter rules and blacklisting as we only state explicit prohibits on packets that match a specic pattern. In the following, we investigate rule sets that are distributed over a subset of nodes comprising an IP network, thereby assembling a distributed packet lter conguration that enforces a specic global lter policy with local packet lters without requiring a deployment of singular rewall systems.
Direction-based Filtering
Adversaries have long since adapted to the existence of packet lter systems and thus have developed their own set of techniques to circumvent them as far as possible. One method is to let the injected packets just look like legitimate packets this is possible because IP networks allow every user to craft the packets they are going to send into the network themselves. This technique has long been known as spoong [15] and is still quite popular despite increased deployment of anti-spoong mechanisms in modern access networks; mostly because these types of networks still account only for a small fraction of all vulnerable hosts 2 E.g. Cisco, Juniper Networks.
within the Internet [03, 04] . As a consequence, when activating allowing and disallowing lters on an interface of a network node, the operator faces a tradeo concerning legitimate and malicious trac that traverses this interface: if accepting lters are active, malicios data packets crafted by the adversary to match the congured pattern within the classier will be falsely allowed into the network. We call this a false negative lter decision. On the other hand, prohibitive lters that have been placed on a path where legitimate packets travel will discard them, usually terminating a favored connection. This case we call a false positive lter decision. An operator therefore must anticipate the directions where the legitmate and malicious packet ows will most likely come from, to minimize the costs incurred by either false positives or false negatives. This is illustrated by Fig. 1 where the alternative lter placements inuence future potential damages for the operator. The underlying problem is thus to nd the minimum costs associated with each packet lter conguration in terms of this trade-o. Formally speaking, we have source nodes sO(operator) and sA(adversary) and destination node d paths pO ∈ PO, which is the path set for all paths from sO to d paths pA ∈ PA, which is the path set for all paths from sA to d probability ωp o of a false positive case that a lter wrongly terminates a connection, this is a compound of the initial probability that this connection itself is up and that it is ltered somewhere on the path pO damage DO that is incurred if this connection to a service, e.g. SSH from management system to managed control node, is lost due to a misplaced lter operational risk RO = ωp o DO probability ϕp A of a false negative case where an attacker succeeds in sending packets to the destination node, this is a compound of the initial probability that the attacker sends packets and that he is not ltered anywhere on the path pO damage DA that is incurred by disruptions caused by an adversary on needed services, e.g. an overloaded SSH port within a control node due to a missing lter attack risk RA = ωp A DA
As the costs in terms of the above risks are disjoint for all possible lter congurations, because either a prohibitive lter has been placed there (in this case ϕ will always be 0) or an allowance lter has been placed (here, ω will always be 0), total costs are additive over the set of valid paths from s O to d and s A to d:
The challenge now is to minimize the total risk for the operator by choosing an ecient distributed packet lter conguration.
Routing Interference
Network operators are usually more concerned with availability issues than with security issues; however, when it comes to distributed packet lter congurations, both requirements overlap signicantly. As we have established in the preceeding section, the major task when trying to minimize false negatives and false positives is to reliably determine sources of legitimate and malicious trac ows.
Unfortunately, in carrier-grade networks these sources change quite frequently as network components fail and resilience mechanisms set up alternative paths.
As a consequence, the probability of a specic trac ow to appear at a specic network nodes interface also depends upon the failure probabilities of the network components and the characteristics of the resilience mechanisms in place. In IP networks, the most important resilience mechanism is its destination-based, hop-by-hop routing mechanism. It determines, based on a routing plan, within all forwarding nodes the best next hop for known destination networks. When a (a) (b) (c) Fig. 2 : Filter placement and routing interference. In this small example scenario, packets a routed in an destination-based, hop-by-hop fashion. The lter placement on edge e6 prohibits attack packets from reaching destination node d in the failure-free situation (a), but this changes signicantly when edges e5 or e6 fail. In (b), legitimate trac is shifted by the routing plan onto a new path that runs over the ltering edge e6, resulting in a lost management connection. In (c), attack trac is wrongy detoured along a non-ltered path, allowing attack packets to reach d. network component a node or a link fails, a routing algorithm adjusts to the new network state and disseminates the information about new best next hops, which are then stored in the forwarding table. The diculty with this resilience mechanism and static packet lter congurations is illustrated in Fig. 2 : when a failure occurs, packet ows may be directed over alternative paths, which may result in the wrong ows being dropped (giving a false positive) or accepted (giving a false negative). When trying to integrate a distributed lter conguration with a resilience method based on routing, one must take these trade-os into account. The major problem is thus to incorporate the routing plan for as many network states as possible to get the corresponding path sets.
Distributed Packet Filter Computation
Generally speaking, we are in search for a packet lter conguration that protects our network from malicious packet ows coming from a specic attack source. Usually, this attack source is somewhere outside our network, whereas the valid packet source (e.g. a management station) is somewhere inside. The task is therefore to nd a border between outside and inside, and to nd one that is short, to avoid placing too many lter rules and to keep the number of nodes that enforce the lters small. We are furthermore interested in a exible mechanism that can cope with shifting security requirements such as changed damage factors or threat levels, i.e. the inital attack probability. Operators in the past simply put lters on their border routers, which is easy (there is no need to specify attack sources, probabilities and damage factors) but in many cases not ecient. The mechanism we describe here is therefore designed to compute a corresponding virtual border by minimizing the total risk as described in section 2.1 and simultaneously keeping the number of lter congurations to deploy as small as possible.
A Flexible Packet Filter Placement Algorithm
Any approach providing a way to compute direction-based packet lter congurations must incorporate a legitimate, desired usage scenario and a malicious, non-desired threat scenario in order to nd a suitable border and place permits and prohibits accordingly. Each of those scenarios will be composed of a ow description and a topologic source specication which indicates from which direction a specic ow is expected to come. In our approach, both use and threat scenario correspond to the same ow description f but provide separate topologic ow source descriptions s O and s A . This means that the ow specifcation itself will provide the necessary information for the lter classers (IP source and destination addresses, transport protocol, source and destination ports) but it acknowledges that adversaries may craft attack packets that will look exactly like legitimate user packets. In constrast to this, the network specication within (a) (b) (c) Fig. 3: In (a) , we reduce an exemplary network topology to a directed graph with destination node d as the sink and edge routers -the interconnection points i1-i4 -together with outside attacking node s A . In (b), the attacking node is connected to the graph at the interconnection points via virtual edges ve1-ve4. When the subgraph containing the dominant operational risk edges has been removed, the residual lter candidate graph emerges as shown in (c).
the use and threat scenarios will give us the needed dierentiation between attack packet streams and user packet streams. This is illustrated by Fig. 3 where the valid source node is known and the operator additionally gives entry points for potential attackers to the network usually these coincide with the interconnection nodes towards neighbor networks.
As has been outlined in section 2.2, anticipating all paths P O , P A that the valid trac and the attack trac may take through the network is a requirement for computing where lter placements would be reasonable to reconcile resilience requirements (routing) with security requirements (ltering). Unfortunately, this generally requires a complete network state enumeration for any combination of failed elements, which is of P#-complexity. However, state space reduction is possible if the number of components per path is not too small and the availability of the components is comparatively high [16] , which is a very typical characterstic of carrier-grade IP networks. Thus, in our algorithm, we rst determine the number of concurrently failed elements we need to inspect, in order to reach a signicantly high share of the state space. We then enumerate over all the remaining states and invoke the routing algorithm used for the network for each state, in conjunction with the legitimate use endpoints (s O , d) and the attack endpoints (s A , d). We thus yield all two sets of most probable paths for both sources, together with the probability by which they will be eective this is done by combining the initial ow probability and the availability data for all components respectively. In the next step, we iterate over all paths and over all edges within the paths and add the specic probability of the selected path to the individual edge. As a result, we get a set of edges that additionally contain their legitimate use and attack probability values. Now, we are able to compute the set of dominant operational risk edges by comparing the individual operating risk and the attack risk of each edge assuming that a path will always be ltered on one edge only. This edge set contains all edges where lters should never be active because the risk of wrongly terminating an important management connection is just too high, compared to the acompanying attack risk. All remaining edges of the network comprise the residual lter candidate graph: at any edge within this graph, a lter may be placed to prevent adversaries from injecting malicious packets, comprising a virtual border. This is illustrated by Fig. 3 (c) , where all dominant operational risk edges have been removed. Until here, we have reasoned how to assess where it is advisable to place lters and where the costs in terms of operational risk prohibits the placement of lters. In the last step, the actual lter placements are computed. Two ways to nd lter placements on the remaining graph are quite obvious: starting from the destination node, going backward over the edges for each path, placing lters as near to the part of the network over which legitime, non-ltered paths run.
This approach, illustrated in Fig. 4 (a) , reduces the availability of the operators connection to a minimum and provides no direct benet. The opposite way is to place the lters as near to the attacker as possible, which is the traditional way, moving lter sets to the border of a network as depicted in 4 (b). Inspecting Fig.   4 (c), we can see that it is possible to prevent adversaries from injecting packets into our network by placing fewer lters than the traditional border-placement strategy would suggest. Thus one optimization is to compute a minimal cutting path edge set. Another variant of this strategy is not to minimize the total number of lters to be set up but to minimize the number of nodes where lters must be congured which is the result of a minimal cutting path node set. It is easy to see in the example network that a minimal cutting path node set is {i 2 ,i 4 ,i 3 } or {n 2 ,n 1 ,i 3 }. This indicates that we usually will get more alternatives here, raising the opportunity to optimize based on lter costs that can be set by the operator.
If operators need to upgrade their routing platforms in order to deploy extensive packet lter setups, they may prefer to keep the number of upgrades small and they may prefer to choose the least costly upgrades: if upgrades for the nodes n 1 and n 2 are cheaper than for the interconnection points, they will prefer the latter variant. Algorithm 1 represents a method to compute an ecient virtual border for lter placements based on the minimal lter number variant. ( Step 0: Extract state space Θ) ( Step 1: Extract path sets) for all sources s O ∈ S O , s A ∈ S A do for all states σ ∈ Θ do
for all paths p ∈ P A do if ∈ p then add 1 to edge candidate count c choose from Fc with highest c (it is cutting the most paths)
for all paths p ∈ P A do if ∈ p then
Step 3
Algorithm 1: Filter placement by creating a short virtual border
The complexity of this algorithm can be inuenced quite heavily by the operator.
Shortest path computations exhibit O(m × log(n)) each for adverse topologies [19] and have to run over the selected state space which can amount to O(2 n ) if fully explored. The computations of the risk distances are of linear complexity and a formally correct implemented minimal cut on the residual path set will run O( √ n × m) [20] , but both have to be invoked only once per f and are thus neglibible. If the state space is conned to a sensible proportion with respect to the discriminating risk function, the overall computational time for each f considered usually is within an acceptable timeframe for the example depicted by Fig. 6 , computations were well below 10 seconds for 5% of the state space.
However, path exploration on the state space remains a critical issue for the method used here. 
Incorporating Platform Capabilities
Until now we have investigated how a distributed packet lter conguration that locally enforces a global lter policy can be compiled in an ecient way.
However, operators often face the problem that platforms do not share the same capabilities, which are subject to the installed software release or acquired feature set. As a consequence, networks may include nodes that are not capable of ltering the considered packet ow f , for one of the following reasons: the node is technically not able to classify for f the node is technically not able to execute a drop or accept action on packets that match f the node is principally capable of ltering packets that match f , however, crucial information needed by the classier is not available (e.g. IP addresses describing f cannot be obtained) the operator does not want the node to lter packets matching f , because of performance considerations ( Step 3: Compute risk distance) ...
if ω D O < ϕ D A and ∈ C (the set of lter capable edges) then
Issue notice: "remaining attack paths P A not ltered!" Algorithm 2: Filter placement with capability integration
We can easily incorporate this case into our existing framework by rst checking all edges in the network for their respective lter capabilities, excluding those edges that do not have their source in a node that can put outgoing lters on their respective interface and the destination in node that cannot put ingoing lters on the respective interface. The resulting lter capable edge set C is used within Algorithm 2 to avoid edges where lters cannot be set up. If the attack path set cannot be emptied after all candidate edges have been investigated, the user will be noticed that an open attack path still exists.
3 A more exhaustive discussion on algorithmic complexity and running times for test topologies is beyond the scope and limited space of this paper.
Prototype Implementation
The algorithm described above was implemented as a component of a larger management process that takes global access policies for packet ows and converts them to local, platform specic lter rule sets for a given network. We developed a Java application called Access Policy Conguration Point (APCP), that reads a network specication including all nodes within the network and their connections to each other as well as platform type and operating system version a network discovery process providing this specication for a live network was also a part of the application. The user has to provide policy strings, enhanced by damage factors:
protect <application protocol handle> from <source node/group handle> to <desti-nation node/group handle> fp_damage <factor> fn_damage <factor> . statements and the network description as well as the threat specication, the APCP expands all endpoints and the application protocol to build the ow specication and compute the best virtual border. At the end, a syntax database is consulted to yield applicable lter statements for all platforms where lters will be congured.
When these policy specications have been entered and the network description le, which also included a threat specication (subnet specications for external, untrusted networks plus attack probability) has been read, the APCP expands the endpoints for the calculation of the virtual border where lter placement would be most eective. An example is illustrated in Fig. 5 The nishing steps are then to convert the information needed for the classer into the syntactically correct format for each of the target platforms and to export the conguration statements into the nodes themselves. Currently we are able to provide conversion rules for Cisco IOS, Juniper ERX and Linux platforms.
As a case study, we took a topology known from UUNET and applied a use and a threat scenario where an internal management connection has to be protected against attack sources placed at the borders, as illustrated by Fig. 6. 
Discussion
Our mechanism allows a exible computation of ecient packet lter placements along a virtual border within the network, with respect to given usage and threat scenarios and a weighting function (by damage factor). However, one might argue against anticipatory, static packet lter congurations we have presented here, favoring adaptive, dynamic packet lter mechanisms, because the best method against routing interference is, of course, to incorporate the network state and the accompanying routing decisions into the lter placement decision just-in-time.
To give an example following the case depicted in Fig. 2 : a drop lter should only be in placed and active in node v 2 , if edge e 5 is operational. Particularly when using link-state routing algorithms, which require every node to contain a full view of the complete network state, it is possible to create ad-hoc ltering decisions on the routing information. This has also been suggested in a slightly dierent manner in [17] . However, several reasons can be put forward against such a mechanism:
1. In contrast to routing, operators usually do not want an automated, selfadapting ltering mechanism, simply because of the disruptive eects of drop lters.
2. When a change in the topology of the network occurs, routing algorithms always have a convergence period. Within this period, dynamically placed packet lters may wrongly discard packets (similar to the micro-loop eect seen with OSPF [18] ; when using protocols such as BGP, the convergence period is even within minutes).
3. Currently, there exists no single routing or switching platform that implements dynamic, network state dependent packet lters.
Thus our approach is more suitable for the problems carrier-grade operators face currently, even with the input overhead needed in contrast to the traditional, border placement of lters. However, in terms of computational complexity, the runtime behaviour for Step 1 the extraction of all possible path sets still needs improvements. When not using an incremental routing algorithm [19] , a full convergence for each failure condition set by Step 0 is needed, which is for networks with hundreds of nodes in the range of tens of seconds each.
When this is multiplied by the number of states needed for a signicant share of the complete state space, computation time reaches tens of minutes, in adverse circumstances even more than an hour.
Conclusions
In this paper we presented a new, exible mechanism for computing distributed packet lter congurations for large, heterogenous IP networks. Instead of placing lters at outer borders only, our algorithm usually nds a more ecient virtual border, reducing the number of lters needed. We integrated a lter capability detection method in order to maintain a tight lter setup despite nodes not being available for lter conguration. We implemented the mechanism and enhanced it with a syntax conversion to meet platform-specic conguration demands and were thus able to demonstrate its usefulness for carrier-grade, multi-vendor environments.
For future work, we plan to evaluate the suitability of the mechanism for dierent topology sets and varying usage and threat scenarios. Furthermore, we will expand the set of lter actions, which are not restricted to drop and accept lters only, but can, depending on the purpose of the individual lter setup, include rate limiting, normalizing and cryptographic processing as well.
